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Th e main research subjects of this study are: (1) the naval force under the command of 
the Governor-general of Dalmatia and Albania, in this paper referred to as the Adriatic 
squadron, and (2) the problems of organization of defense of the Adriatic during the 
War for Crete (1645-1669). More precisely, this article deals with the operational tasks 
assigned to the Adriatic squadron during this war, its composition, governance, admin-
istration and main logistics problems related to keeping this force operational in an 
armed confl ict lasting for more than 20 years. Furthermore, the essay also addresses the 
question of the strategic importance of Adriatic for the Venetian Republic in case of war 
in the Levant, and it argues that the rulers of the Republic were clearly aware of the 
threat that the loss of control over the sea lanes of communication in the Adriatic would 
have for the overall Venetian war eff ort and consequently committed signifi cant naval 
forces to the Adriatic theater of operations. 
Keywords: Republic of Venice, War for Crete, Ottoman Empire, New Military 
History, Adriatic, Naval warfare, Early Modern Period, Galleys, Barche Armate, 
Fuste, Galeotte.
1. Introduction: Th e Adriatic Naval Squadron
Th e war for Crete (1645-1669) in general, and military operations in Adriatic 
 during this confl ict in particular, have so far been the subject of numerous studies.1 
1 Gligor Stanojević, “Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata,” Vesnik vojnog muzeja 5, num. 2. (1958): pp. 
93-182.; Radovan Samardžić, “Kandijski rat (1645-1669) in Istorija Srpskog Naroda, vol. 3. num. 1. ed. 
200 Domagoj Madunić, Th e Adriatic Naval Squadron (1645-1669)...
However, due to the nature of warfare in the Adriatic battlefi eld with the pre-
dominance of land operations, existing studies have mainly concentrated on the 
aspects of land warfare: sieges, course of the campaigns, political context in 
which operations took place etc. As a result, the naval aspect of this confl ict in 
the Adriatic region has been left  somewhat underrepresented and understud-
ied.2 It may be that no dramatic naval engagements, such as those fought in the 
Dardanelles during 1654-1657, took place in the Adriatic during this war. Still, 
securing the sea lanes of communication in the Adriatic was the mandatory 
precondition for Venice to be able to wage war in the Levant at all. As this paper 
will show, the Republic, aware of this strategic threat, committed signifi cant 
naval forces (though not as many as its governor-generals in Zadar wished) to 
the Adriatic theater of operations. Th is naval force, in this essay referred to as 
the “Adriatic squadron”, its operational tasks, composition, governance, organi-
zation and logistics are the main research subjects of this study.
Th e origins of this naval force date back to year 1301, when the fi rst permanent 
fl eet charged with protection of the Adriatic against pirates and invasions of hos-
tile fl eets was organized by Venice. Th is force, known under the name of “fl eet of 
the Adriatic”, consisted mainly of galleys and its main bases of operations were 
Venice and Corfu.3 By contrast, its seventeenth-century counterpart (referred to 
Radovan Samardžić, pp. 336-424. (Beograd: Srpska književna zadruga, 1993); Tea Mayhew, Dalmatia 
between Ottoman and Venetian Rule. Contado di Zara 1645-1718. (Rome: Viella, 2008) pp. 29-48.; 
Marko Jačov, Le guerre Veneto-Turche del XVII secolo in Dalmatia, Atti e memorie della Societa’ Dal-
mata di storia patria 20 (1991), pp. 9-145; Giuseppe Praga, History of Dalmatia, (Pisa: Giardini, 1993) 
pp. 188-192; Karlo Kosor “Drniška Krajina za turskog vladanja,” u Povijest Drniške Krajine. ed. Ante 
Čavka, pp. 103-179 (Split, 1995). For general literature on the war for Crete see: Kenneth M. Setton, 
Venice, Austria, and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century. (Philadelphia: American Philosophical So-
ciety, 1991) pp. 104-243; Ekkehard Eickhoff , Vendig, Wien und die Osmanen. Umbruch in Sudosteuro-
pa 1645-1700 (Munchen: Verlag Georg D. W. Callwey, 1970) pp. 17-176, 228-264.
2 In addition to a few smaller studies dealing with the problems of piracy in the Adriatic during the 
war for Crete, the only notable exceptions to this statement are 1937 studies by the Italian historian 
Feruccio Sassi and a recent study by Josip Vrandečić. Sassi was the fi rst to point out the role the navy 
played in the success of the Venetian arms in this theater of operations. Vrandečić positioned warfare 
in the Dalmatian battlefi eld in a wider early modern European military context by linking it to the 
well-known concept of Military Revolution and emphasizing the use of combined arms (naval and 
land forces) in the Venetian military operations. Feruccio Sassi, “Le Campagne di Dalmazia durante 
la Guerra di Candia (1645-1648)” Archivio Veneto 20 (1937): pp. 211-250. (henceforth: Sassi 1); Feruc-
cio Sassi, “Le Campagne di Dalmazia durante la Guerra di Candia (1645-1648)” Archivio Veneto 21 
(1937): pp. 60-100.; Josip Vrandečić, Borba za Jadran u ranom novom vijeku: Mletačko-osmanski ra-
tovi u venecijanskoj nuncijaturi1524-1797 [Fighting for the Adriatic in the Early Modern Period: Vene-
tian-Ottoman wars in the records of the Venetian Nuntio Archival Documents], (Split: Filozofski fakultet 
u Splitu, 2013) (henceforth: Borba za Jadran)
3 For more on the organization of this fi rst permanent fl eet operating in the Adriatic see: Ruthy Gert-
wagen, “Th e Island of Corfu in Venetian Policy in the Fourteenth and Early Fift eenth Centuries,” 
Povijesni prilozi 45., 199-235 (2013.) 201
in this article as the Adriatic squadron) had as its main naval base the Dalmatian 
town of Zadar and was composed mainly of smaller warships: barche armate, 
galeotte and fuste. Th e Republic of Venice had not established elaborate institu-
tional infrastructure for this force, in the form of its own admiralty, separate treas-
ury, command structure, as was for example the case with the famous Spanish 
Armada of Flanders.4 Still, the Adriatic squadron was a real and independent 
naval force with its separate command structure (at least in war time), opera-
tional tasks, and supportive infrastructure in the form of two arsenals: the main 
one at Zadar (Zara)5 and a smaller auxiliary one at the island of Hvar (Lessina). 
As such, the Adriatic squadron is best described as a semi-permanent fl eet of 
state-owned, state-administered warships, serving in the Adriatic under the com-
mand of Governor-general of Dalmatia and Albania in Zadar. 
Before proceeding further, one more caveat is called for. Venetian light galleys 
(galee sottile) and galleasses rank among the most famous topics of naval his-
tory in general. It is practically impossible to fi nd a study of the early modern 
naval warfare without a section dedicated to these ships. Moreover, narrower 
studies of Venetian history have assigned the galleys and the command of the 
sea one of the central places in the success story of this city-state. All in all, it 
can safely be said that both the Venetian merchant and the war fl eet alike rep-
resent well researched subjects with a considerable number of studies covering 
a wide range of topics related to these ships: their use, arming of their crews, 
construction and administrative problems. Due to these reasons and in order to 
avoid repeating topics well covered by the existing studies, in this article the 
space dedicated to the Venetian galleys in the service in Adriatic is intention-
ally limited and emphasis has been put on other, smaller vessels of the Adriatic 
naval squadron so far less researched, namely armed boats (barche armate), 
fuste, galeotte and brigantini. Th is decision can be further justifi ed by the nature 
of the naval warfare in the Adriatic and the tasks put before this squadron by 
the Venetian high command.
 International Journal of Maritime History 19, num. 1 (2007): pp. 181-210; Beatriz Doumerc, “La difesa 
dell’impero,” in Storia di Venezia. Vol. 3. Gioralmo Arnaldi, Alberto Tenenti and Giorgio Cracco eds. 
pp. 240, 244, 246. (Roma, 1997); Irene B. Katele, “Piracy and the Venetian State: Th e Dilemma of 
Maritime Defence in the Fourteenth Century,” Speculum LXIII (1988): pp. 867-871.
4 Robert A. Stradling, Armada of Flanders: Spanish Maritime Policy and European War, 1568-1668 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), especially pp. 176-203.
5 For more on Zadar arsenal see: Michela dal Borgo and Gugliemo Zanelli, Zara. Una fortezza, un 
porto, un arsenale (secoli XV-XVIII), (Roma: Viella, 2008)
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2. Organization of Defense of the Adriatic Prior to the War for Crete
… the importance of preserving this province [Dalmatia], which can be 
considered the maritime suburb of Venice, is well known to common wisdom;
(Governor-general Girolamo Foscarini, April 1653)6
Devo dire anco, che la detta prouincia situata nel stato bislungo della Serenità 
Vostra, da brazzo е mano, е unisce nella communicatione il regno di Candia et 
isole del Leuante, con la città dominante Istria е stati di terraferma. Riceue in se 
medesima et assicura con la multiplicita de porta la nauigatione in uniuersale, е 
par che la natura l’habbi leuato alle riue del regno di Napoli е luochi della Marca, 
per multiplicarli a fregio di quella prouincia, е senza i medesimi impraticabile 
sarebe certo il Golfo ne i rigori del uerno.
(Governor-general Giovanni Battista Grimani, August 1644)7
Th e dominion over the Adriatic Sea was a foundation on which the prosperity 
and existence of the Most Serene Republic rested. “First and last, Venice de-
pended on the Adriatic,”8 wrote Frederic Chapin Lane, simply and accurately 
summarizing the connection between Venice and the Adriatic. Furthermore, 
lordship over the Adriatic was not merely a basis for Venetian economic domi-
nance in the region, but also a premise deeply rooted in the political culture of 
the Venetian ruling elite. Venice considered the Adriatic Gulf as its sovereign 
territory and claimed the exclusive right to maintain armed vessels in it.9 Th ese 
were not just empty symbolic statements; in order to defend its dominion of the 
Adriatic and eradicate piracy, the Republic was ready to go as far as to risk a 
war with the much more powerful states. For example, in 1615, frustrated by the 
inability and lack of interest of the Habsburg court in Vienna to restrain the 
actions of its privateers (uskoks) operating from the port of Senj (Segna), the 
Republic not only attacked and sealed off  the port, but also invaded the Habsburg 
possession in Istria, provoking a full scale war with both Austrian and Spanish 
branch of the Habsburgs.10 Similarly, though it is oft en assumed that the Repub-
6 … alla sapienza publica è soffi  cientemente nota l’importanza dell’ conservatione di questa Provintia, 
che dalla parte di Mare, si può chiamar li Borghi di Venetia. Archivio di Stato di Venezia (henceforth 
ASVe), Senato, Deliberazioni, Provveditori da Terra e da Mar (henceforth PTM). b(usta). 472. num.
(ber) 99. (Zara, 18. Aprile 1652.) [Translation by the author]
7 Grga Novak, Mletačka uputstva i izvještaji [Venetian Commissions and Reports], vol. 8, (Zagreb: 
HAZU, 1977) p. 181. (henceforth Mletačka uputstva)
8 Frederic C. Lane, Venice: A Maritime Republic (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1973) p. 407.
9 For more on ideological foundations see: Filippo de Vivo “Historical Justifi cations of Venetian Pow-
er in the Adriatic,” Journal of the History of Ideas 64 (2003), pp. 159-76.; Compare also: Roberto 
Cessi, La Repubblica di Venezia e il problema Adriatico (Napoli: Edizioni scientifi che italiane, 1953)
10 For more on Uskok or Gradisca War see: John R. Hale and Mallett E. Michael, Th e Military Orga-
nization of a Renaissance State. Venice c.1400-1617. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) 
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lic was more lenient in its conduct toward the Sublime Porte, some actions 
could not be tolerated. For example, in 1638, when a corsair fl eet consisting of 
16 galleys from Algeria and Tunis retreated to the Ottoman port of Vlorë (Val-
ona) aft er its raids in Adriatic, the Venetian Senate ordered the most radical 
step. A Venetian fl eet forced its way into the port, attacked the corsair ships and 
bombarded the town forts, risking the wrath of the Porte.11
However, these two episodes were rather extraordinary. From the conclusion of 
the peace with the Ottoman Empire in 1573, the Republic enjoyed a long period 
of peace during which the main threat to the Venetian dominion over Adriatic 
came not from other states but from a far lower profi le enemy: pirates.12 From 
the last decades of the sixteenth century, pirate activity was on the rise all over 
the Mediterranean and the Adriatic was no exception. During the sixteenth cen-
tury, the Ottoman ports of Ulcinj (Dolcigno), Herceg-Novi (Castelnuovo) and 
the island of St. Maura (Leucas in the Ionian Sea) developed into thriving cor-
sair bases which constantly threatened navigation in the Adriatic. Similarly, as 
previously mentioned, the Habsburg port of Senj in the northern Adriatic de-
veloped into a major base of Christian privateers, the so-called uskoks. Nomi-
nally in the service of the Austrian Habsburgs, uskoks very quickly became the 
most severe threat to the security of shipping in the Adriatic. Under the pretext 
of a holy war, these Christian privateers not only attacked Ottoman targets in 
the costal hinterland, but also indiscriminately raided shipping all over the 
Adriatic.13 Activity of the uskoks more than anything else was a constant source 
of tensions between the Republic and the Ottoman and Habsburg empires, cul-
minating in the previously mentioned, short but rather destructive “Uskok/
Gradisca War” (1615-1618).
In the years aft er the end of Cyprus war (1570-1573), in order to secure the 
safety of navigation, Venice divided the Adriatic Sea into three operational zones 
pp. 241-247; Mirosav Bertoša, Istra: Doba Venecije (XVI.-XVIII. stoljeć e) (Pula: Zavičajna naklada 
‘Žakan Juri’, 1995) pp. 290-413.
11 Kenneth M. Setton, Venice, Austria, and the Turks in the seventeenth century, pp. 108-109; Ekkehard 
Eickhoff , Vendig, Wien und die Osmanen, p. 20-1.
12 Alberto Tenenti, Piracy and the Decline of Venice 1580-1615 (London: Longmans, Green and Co. 
Ltd, 1967) pp. 3-86; 
13 Existing literature on the uskoks is immense and beyond the scope of this paper. Th e most complete 
study on this topic in English is Catherine W. Bracewell, Th e Uskoks of Senj: Piracy, Banditry, and Holy 
War in the Sixteenth-Century Adriatic (Ithaca, 1992). For a detailed study of the uskok raiding activities 
situated in the context of political events of sixteenth century, see: Gligor Stanojević, Senjski uskoci (Th e 
Uskoks of Senj) (Beograd, 1973). For a concise overview concerning the offi  cial attitude of the Porte to-
ward Venetian dominion over the Adriatic and the problem of piracy see: Maria Pia Pedani, “Ottoman 
Merchants in the Adriatic. Trade and Smuggling,” Acta Histriae 16, num. 1-2. (2008): pp. 156-162.
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and assigned one squadron of light galleys to each of them. Policing the very 
top of the Gulf, the area between Venice and Istria, was the task of Captain 
against the Uskoks (Capitano Contra Uschochi) in command of the smallest of 
the three squadrons, consisting of two light galleys and three smaller warships 
(fuste or barche armate – see below). Patrolling of the northern Adriatic, rough-
ly the area between Ancona and the delta of the River Po and from Zadar to 
Rijeka (Fiume) was duty of four galleys under the command of the Governor of 
the Condemned (Governatore dei Condannati), while Captain of the Gulf (Cap-
itano del Golfo) and his seven galleys, stationed at Corfu, were charged with the 
protection of shipping in the rest of the Adriatic.14 
Th is organizational structure, however, was subject to change as circumstances 
demanded. As the uskok threat increased in the late 1580s, in order to better 
coordinate Venetian eff orts in suppressing uskok activities, the offi  ce of Gover-
nor of the Gulf (Provveditor in Golfo Contra Uscocchi or Provveditor general da 
mar in Golfo) was introduced, and the three above mentioned naval command-
ers were put under his command.15 Likewise, as the uskok raids receded aft er the 
Peace of Madrid (1618), the system was further adjusted. Th e domain of respon-
sibility of Capitano del Golfo did not change much, as the Senate transferred to 
him the command of the majority of light galleys serving in the Adriatic. By 
contrast, the offi  ces of Capitano Contra Uschochi and Governor of the Gulf were 
abandoned, while that of Governor of the Condemned was left  without any 
specifi c sea area assigned to him for patrolling. Instead, the task of maintaining 
security of the shipping through the central Adriatic was transferred to the Gov-
ernor-general of Dalmatia and Albania (Provveditore Generala di Dalmazia et 
Albania). Introduced for the fi rst time in 1511, the offi  ce of Governor-general 
of the dual province of Dalmatia and Albania was made permanent as late as 
1597, with the term lasting for two years. Th e Governor-general was the highest 
representative of the Republic in the region and acted as the head of both civil 
and military administration, in command of all land and naval forces of the 
republic stationed in Dalmatia and Venetian Albania.16 Th e process of reorgan-
14 Alberto Tenenti, Piracy and the Decline of Venice, pp. 120-121.; Michael Knapton, “Između Vladarice 
i njezina posjeda [Between Ruler and its dominion],” In Gaetano Cozzi, Michael Knapton and Gio-
vanni Scarabello eds. Povijest Venecije vol. 2. [History of Venice vol. 2] (Zagreb: Anti-Barbarus, 2007) 
p. 369.
15 For example see the reports (relazioni) dating from 1593 and 1598 submitted upon their return from 
the service as governors in the gulf by Almoro Tiepolo and Zuanne Bembo. Grga Novak, Mletačka 
uputstva 5, pp. 45-61, 239-260.;
16 For more on the offi  ce of Governor-general of Dalmatia and Albania see: Maja Novak, “Kada i kako 
je došlo do formiranja službe generalnog providura Dalmacije i Albanije [When and how, it came to 
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ization of zones of competencies in the Adriatic had begun in 1599 with the 
appointment of Nicolò Donado, acting Governor of the Gulf, as the Governor-
general of Dalmatia and Albania with the title of Provveditor general in Golfo 
con autorità et titolo anco del Proveditor General in Dalmatia.17 
Th ough the Captain of the Gulf stationed at Corfu was nominally charged with 
the duty of keeping navigation through the Adriatic safe, in practice, the 
 Governor-general of Dalmatia and Albania became the republic’s sole offi  cial 
responsible for the prevention of contraband and securing navigation through 
northern and central Adriatic, while the southern part of the gulf remained the 
responsibility of the Capitano del Golfo. Th e Governor-general of Dalmatia and 
Albania had under his command a small naval squadron whose core consisted 
of 20-30 smaller warships, so called barche armate, each (nominally) manned 
with a 50 man crew of Croatian or Albanian marine infantry (militie oltrama-
rine). Th e crews of these warships were paid directly by the provincial treasury 
in Zadar and were administered by two governors, one for each of the nation-
alities (i.e. Croats and Albanians).18 Additionally, the Republic kept in the Adri-
atic a few light galleys which were at the disposal of governor-generals, and were 
paid either by the central treasury in Venice or directly by the provincial treas-
ury in Zadar, depending on the circumstances. Th ese were the naval forces the 
Republic had at its disposal in Adriatic when the news of the Ottoman landing 
on the island of Crete reached Dalmatia in summer of 1645.
3.  Th e Adriatic Naval Squadron (1645-1669): operational duties, 
deployment, structure and composition
Ne per miglior partito, o propria contraposizione saprei dire se non che la diff esa 
per mio riuerente parere consisterà sempre nel mantenimento di ben munita ar-
mata. Questa sola potrà souenirla, questa soccorrerla questa conseruarla, sarà 
essa l’unico rimeđio d’ogn’ inuasione, la mano che le porgerà ogni aiuto, anzi che 
the formation of the service of Governor-general of Dalmatia and Albania],” Radovi Instituta JAZU u 
Zadru 15 (1968): pp. 91-112; Maja Novak, “Zadar glavni grad mletačke Dalmacije i Albanije [Zadar 
Capitol of Dalmatia and Venetian Albania,]” Radovi Instituta JAZU u Zadru 11-12 (1965): pp. 187-
201.; Tea Mayhew, Dalmatia between Ottoman and Venetian Rule, pp. 150-156. Compare also: Ivan 
Pederin, Mletač ka uprava, privreda i politika u Dalmaciji (1409. - 1797.) [Venetian administration, 
economic policy and politics in Dalmatia (1409-1797)] (Dubrovnik: Č asopis ‘Dubrovnik’, 1990) pp. 105-
6.; Concerning the formation of the Venetian administrative context, also see: Filippo M. Paladini, Un 
Caos che Spaventa, pp. 13-24.; Giuseppe Praga, History of Dalmatia, pp. 180-1.
17 Grga Novak, Mletačka uputstva 5, pp. 278-299.
18 In 1630s the Republic kept 29 barche armate in Adriatic, whose crews consisted of 1120 marine 
infantry, while in 1644 only 19 barche armate and 805 men were at the disposal of Governor-general. 
Grga Novak, Mletačka uputstva 7, p. 52-3, 214.
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l’armata da mar е quella che sempre sarà il fondamento delle riputazioni delle 
forze di Vostra Serenita, sopra la quale anco ne’ più placidi, et quieti tempi 
dourebbe starsi con pontualita uigorosissima.
(Governor-general Antonia Civran, 1632)19
No other factor can contribute to the safety of these towns, as much as the protec-
tion of some warship accompanied by galleys, with them it is possible to accom-
modate bringing of the help [to the spot] where the most vigorous attacks are 
undertaken.
(Governor-general Antonio Bernardo, October 1656)20 
Since the Middle Ages, navigational routes through the Adriatic had not changed 
much, with ships traveling the East-West direction (and vice versa) favoring the 
route along the Eastern Adriatic coast. Th is preference was due to Adriatic sea 
currents, disposition of the local winds, and the existence of a multitude of 
 islands that provided excellent landmarks for coastal navigation and refuge 
 havens in case of shipwreck. Secondly, because of the still predominant use of 
light galleys as main fi ghting ships in the Mediterranean and their need to reg-
ularly replenish water supplies for their crews,21 the Dalmatian coast, with its 
high density of good anchorages and numerous water sources, suited the navi-
gational needs of this type of a vessel perfectly.22 Light galleys leaving from Ven-
ice for the Levant would usually fi rst make a call in an Istrian port (most oft en 
Koper), then proceed through the gulf of Kvarner, and arrive at Zadar. From 
here on, the route would take them to the island of Hvar and then either in the 
direction of Ragusa or Kotor, or the ship would simply head directly for the next 
major Venetian naval base, the island of Corfu. In case of a war in the Levant, 
the control of these sea routes was of outmost importance for the Venetian war 
eff ort. As Jan Glete pointed out, “Warfare at sea is essentially a contest about the 
maritime lines of communication.”23 Or, to put it simply, the loss of control or 
19 Grga Novak, Mletačka uputstva 7, p. 48.
20 Niuna cosa potria riuscir di più sicura salute di esse Piazze, quanto il calore di qualche Vascello da 
guerra, e di Galere ancora, con quali si potesse accomodare à porgere gl’ aiuti, dovesi facessero più gagli-
ardi gl’ attacchi. ASVe, PTM. b. 480. num. 54. (Trau, 16. Ottobre 1656) [Translation by author]
21 Due to the extreme physical eff ort to which galley rowers were subjected, especially during warm 
Mediterranean summers, water supply was critical for the survival of the crew. Furthermore, long and 
slim design of war galleys left  little room for cargo storage, large part of which had to be fi lled with 
ammunition and war materials as well. Th erefore, it was an absolute necessity for a galley to anchor 
frequently, in intervals no longer than two weeks, at places where water supplies could be replenished. 
John F. Guilmartin, Galleons and Galleys (London: Cassell & Co, 2002) p. 120.
22 For more on sailing routes through the Adriatic see: Mithad Kozličić, “Adriatic Sea Routes from the 
Antiquity to the Early Modern Age,” Histria Antiqua 21 (2012): pp. 13-20.
23 Jan Glete, Warfare at Sea, 1500-1650. Maritime Confl icts and the Transformation of Europe (London: 
Routledge, 2000) p. 1.
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even disruption of maritime lines of communication through the Adriatic would 
have undermined the Republic’s ability to supply its armies and fl eets in the 
Levant, and consequently its ability to wage war at all.
Th erefore, as far as the Venetian Senate was concerned, when the new war with 
the Ottoman Empire began in 1645, ships of the Adriatic squadron were  expected 
to fulfi ll two important tasks. Th e fi rst task was securing the sea lanes of com-
munication in the Adriatic from the attacks of Ottoman corsairs. Th e second, 
equally important task was providing support to the Venetian land forces, espe-
cially in defense of strategically important Dalmatian coastal towns. During the 
war, their tasks consisted of a wide range of duties: from rushing-in emergency 
deliveries of supplies and reinforcements to the endangered towns during Otto-
man attacks, to providing additional fi repower to the Venetian regular and 
 irregular forces fi ghting along the coast, either in small skirmishes or during 
major off ensive operations. 
Tactical deployment of the Adriatic squadron did not change much during the 
entire war and was above all determined by the operational tasks sketched above. 
Starting from 1646, at the beginning of a campaign season in early spring, the 
Adriatic squadron would split into several smaller task forces, each consisting 
of 4-8 vessels, and would deploy to the guard posts along the coast. Th e areas 
of deployment of these task forces were the following: 1) the north littoral, 
stretching from Novigrad (Novegradi) via the Island of Pag (Pago) to the south-
ern border of the Zadar district, 2) Šibenik (Sibenico) and its littoral 3) the 
coastal area between Trogir (Trau), Split (Spalato) and Omiš (Omissa), 4) the 
waters of the islands of Hvar and Korčula (Curzolla) 5) the Bay of Kotor and 6) 
task force under the command of a (extraordinary) governor of the Gulf, (dis-
cussed below) with no specifi c post but charged with cruising the Adriatic in 
search for Ottoman corsairs. Th e actual number of ships deployed at each par-
ticular post changed from year to year, and depended, above all, on estimation 
of the level of danger of an Ottoman attack. For example, during the years 1653-
1656, when Split fi gured as the most threatened target, up to 20 armed vessels 
were positioned in its waters.24 Similarly, in 1657 before and during the siege of 
Kotor, the Republic deployed the major part of the Adriatic squadron (six gal-
leys, three sail gunships and about 20 smaller armed boats) in that area.25 
24 ASVe, PTM. b. 474. num. 16. (Spalato, 4 Marzo 1653) attachment: Notta di Militie che sono in 
Spalato, Clissa, et Almissa con le Barc’ Armate.
25 ASVe, Senato Dispacci, PTM. b. 481, num. 118. (Zara, 14. Agosto 1657); num. 127. (Cattaro, 11. 
Settembre 1657)
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3. 1. Armed Boats (barche armate) and Brigantini
Th e operational requirements of the Adriatic squadron’s duties also dictated its 
composition. Table 1 below shows the numbers of particular types of ships serv-
ing in the Adriatic squadron during this war. As it may be seen, the core of the 
squadron consisted of a small group of light galleys (usually 3-5, though in 
special occasions their number could rise up to 10-12 galleys), yet the bulk of 
the Republic’s naval forces in the Adriatic consisted of smaller warships: fuste, 
galeotte, barche armate and brigantini. Such composition was the direct result of 
the need to provide armed vessels for each of the many guard posts along the 
coast. All these vessels belong to the category of small, oar propelled warships, 
armed with varied number of guns and heavy fi rearms. Brigantini and armed 
boats (barche armate) were the smallest, and consisted of a single deck with 
between 10 to 12 benches (one oar per each) and one sail. Each vessel carried 
crew of one company of Croatian or Albanian marine infantry (known in Vene-
tian sources as fanti oltramarini)26 with strength of up to 50 men, and was usu-
ally armed with two heavy muskets (moschetti da braga), two nine pounder 
periere27 and one three pounder falconeto.28 Fuste and galeotte represented small-
er versions of the galleys (with a galeotta being slightly bigger than a fusta), with 
14-18 benches and a single triangular sail. Armament of these ships varied, but 
usually consisted of six periere of diff erent calibers (mainly 9 and 12 pounders) 
and six heavy muskets. Th eir crews were larger than those of armed boats or 
brigantini, numbering between 60 to 100 men and thus requiring two full com-
panies of marine infantry to arm them.29 
26 For more on the structure and organization of Venetian land forces in the mid-seventeenth century 
and their division into various “national” (overseas – oltramarini, transalpine – oltramontani) troop 
types see: Sergio Perini, “Le milizie della terraferma veneta verso la metà del Seicento,” Studi Veneziani 
29. (1995): pp. 193-210.; Domagoj Madunić, Defensiones Dalmatiae, pp. 142-155.; Tea Mayhew, 
“Mletački vojnik na istočnoj obali Jadrana za kandijskog rata [Venetian soldier on the Easter Adriatic 
Coast during Candian War]” In Spomenica prof. dr. sc. Josipa Adamčeka [Memorial for prof. Josip 
Adamček], Drago Roksandić and Damir Agičić, eds. pp 243-262. (Zagreb: FF Press, 2009); Lovorka 
Čoralić, “U okrilju Privedre – Mletačka Republika i hrvatski Jadran [Under the auspices of Serenis-
sima – Venetian Republic and the Croatian Adriatic]” Povijesni Prilozi 37 (2009): p. 16. 
27 Periere were gunpowder weapons of a smaller caliber loaded with replaceable gunpowder cartridges, 
commonly used to arm fregates, fuste and galeotte. See: Marco Morin, “Artiglierie navali in ambito 
veneziano: tipologie e tecniche di realizzazione,” Quaderni di oplologia 23, (2006): pp. 3–28. For more 
on the historical development of these weapons see: Kelly DeVries and Robert D. Smith, “Removable 
Powder Chambers in Early Gunpowder Weapons,” In Gunpowder, Explosives, and the State. A Techno-
logical History. ed. Brenda Buchanan (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005) pp. 251-265.
28 Alberto Tenenti, Piracy and the Decline of Venice, pp. 152-3. Th e armaments quoted above were issued to 
the brigantino of governatore Fivi in March 1646. ASVe, Senato Mar, R-104, f. 35R, A di 2 Marzo 1646.
29 Alberto Tenenti, Piracy and the Decline of Venice, pp. 154; For the armaments of these see: ASVe, 
PTM. b. 489, num. 34. (Spalato, 22. Ottobre 1662) attachment: Nota da nuovi arsili di galeotte con gli 
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Once it became clear that a war with the Ottoman Empire was imminent, the 
Adriatic naval squadron went through rapid expansion similar to that of the 
Republic’s land forces in the region.30 In March 1646, the Senate informed Gov-
ernor-general Lunardo Foscolo that 12 hulls of armed boats were ready to be 
sent to Dalmatia, while at the same time, the magistrates of the Arsenal have 
been ordered to prepare further 20, all destined for service in the Adriatic.31 A 
few months later, in December 1646, another ten armed boats were dispatched 
to Dalmatia.32 Besides sending such bulk reinforcements of hulls, the Adriatic 
squadron was also gradually strengthened by issuing armed boats to individual 
captains who were commissioned by the Senate with recruiting new extraordi-
nary companies of oltramarini, destined for service in the Adriatic.33 With these 
reinforcements, by 1647 the number of brigantini and armed boats in Adriatic 
squadron rose from 20 to more than 40 vessels. As it can be seen from Table 1, 
between 1646 and 1660 the number of these smaller warships serving in the 
Adriatic squadron was maintained at around 40-50 vessels.
Table 1. Composition of the Adriatic Naval squadron (1646-1669).







1646. June 7 30 0 Sassi I. pp. 239-240.
1647. October - 
February





12 45 0 0 PTM-467-519; 
Galleys: PTM-468-
552;
1649. March 10 PTM-468-565;
1650. March 31 0 0 (1) PTM-470-687;
1650. September 3 PTM-470-755;
1651. June 5 0 PTM-471-34;
armizzi et armi che occorrano; Compare also John Guilmartin F., Galleons and Gallyes, (London: Cas-
sel & Co, 2002) pp. 113-4.
30 For growth of the Venetian land forces in Dalmatia see: Sassi 1, pp. 230, 242-4.; Domagoj Madunić, 
Defensiones Dalmatiae: Governance and Logistics of the Venetian Defensive System in Dalmatia During 
the War for Crete (1645 – 1669), Doctoral dissertation, Central European University, Budapest, 2012. 
pp. 247-258.
31 ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-17, f. 59v-60r, Adi 16. Marzo 1646.
32 ASVe, Senato Mar, R-104, f. 324, Adi 24 Decembre 1646.
33 Such was for example case with Captain Marco Sodorovich in March 1646. ASVe, Senato Mar, 
R-104, f. 34v, Adi 2. Marzo 1646.; See also: ASVe, Senato Mar, R-104, f. 277v-278r, Adi 2 Novembre 
1646.
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1652. April 3 40 1 0 (1) PTM-472-99-Nota 
delli pagamenti;
1652. July 4 1 PTM-473-115;
1653. December 5 40 1 0 (1) PTM-475-97; 
(Galleys: November)
1654. October 5 39 0 0 (1) PTM-476-165; 
PTM-476-159;
1655. February 49 0 0 PTM-477-6;
1656. July-August 6 35 3 1 PTM-479-19; 
PTM-480-21-22;
1657. January 6 35 4 1 PTM-480-80;




7 41 0 4 (4) PTM-483-193; PTM-
484-222; SRR-33-56;
1659. July 7 PTM-485-257;
1660. March 6 ? ? 0 PTM-487-3;
1661. June 5 ? 5 0 PTM-487-18;
1661. September ? 8 0 PTM-488-91;
1662. June-Octo-
ber




5 3 (5) PTM-490-
60;PTM-491-95;
1664. September 6 15 0 PTM-492-176;
1665. January-
Feb.
6 15 0 PTM-493-
8;PTM-493-20;
1665. December 6 25 0 PTM-495-111; 
PTM-495-112;
1666. June 6 25 0 PTM-496-163;
1668. January 7 0 21 0 PTM-498-
35;PTM-498-39; 
(1) Does not include ships at guard duty in the Bay of Kotor.
(2) Arrival of seasonal reinforcements of 3 galleys from Corfu.
(3) Four of 18 fuste and galeotte were galeotte grande.
(4) Th e number of fuste or galeotte among these 41 armed boats cannot be established.
(5) One of the sail ships is a Venetian galeazza
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3. 2. Small Galleys (galeotte) and Fuste
From 1656 the composition of the Adriatic force began to change and over the 
years armed boats and brigantini were completely replaced by their larger coun-
terparts: fuste and galeotte (see Table 1 above). Th is change was in the fi rst place 
a result of a shift  in the nature of warfare in the Adriatic. Although successful 
Venetian land off ensives in 1647 and 1648 and destruction of all major Ottoman 
strongholds south of Dinaric mountains somewhat decreased the direct danger 
to Dalmatian coastal towns, starting from 1654 a growing number of Ottoman 
corsairs that begun operating in the Adriatic posed a new threat to Venetian 
shipping. Small and agile, armed boats and brigantini well suited the needs of 
the fi rst several years of the war when the navy was used mainly as the support 
for the operations of the Venetian land forces. Yet, the change of the Venetian 
strategy in this battlefi eld from active off ense to passive defense, combined with 
increased activity of the Ottoman corsairs in the Adriatic, shift ed the focus of 
duties of the Adriatic squadron. Its main priority became securing navigation 
through the Gulf. Armed boats, smaller than Ottoman fuste, were not well suit-
ed for the task of persecuting these ships. Although 2-3 armed boats could  easily 
overcome one Ottoman fusta, the smaller number of rowers made these Vene-
tian warships much slower than the Ottoman vessels and thus usually unable to 
catch them.
Th e larger Venetian galleys, when fully manned, were, in terms of speed and 
combat strength, far superior to Ottoman fuste, yet, these warships were rather 
cumbersome tools for pursuing Ottoman corsairs. Th is was in the fi rst place due 
to the fact that the galleys required very large crews, and chronic problem of 
manning enough sailors for its warships, which had troubled Venetian navy in 
previous decades, was only amplifi ed during wartime and in the end caused 
reduced maneuverability of these vessels.34 Finally, due to the needs of naval 
operations in the Levant, the number of galleys in the Adriatic was always lim-
ited and they had to be supported with smaller warships, in this case armed 
boats, which only slowed them down. All these problems were presented to the 
Senate in June 1660 by Governor-general Andrea Corner. As the solution to the 
problem, he advised replacement of the worn out armed boats with galeotte, the 
number of which at that moment was already slowly rising (see Table 1).35 Gale-
34 See: Alberto Tenenti, Piracy and the Decline of Venice, pp. 112-116; For a more detailed coverage of 
problems of manning Venetian war galleys see: Luca Lo Basso, Uomini da remo. Galee e galeotti del 
Mediterraneo in età moderna, (Milano: Selene Edizioni, 2004) pp. 35-175.;
35 ASVe, PTM. 487, num. 31. (Sebenico, 27. Luglio 1660); num. 33 (Sebenico, 13. Agosto 1660); num. 
61. (Zara, 6. Gennaro 1660 m.v.)
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otte were perfectly suited to the task of persecuting Ottoman fuste: slightly larg-
er, they could match fuste both in speed and in strength. Th us a task force of 
galeotte could either operate independently or as a support of the galleys with-
out signifi cantly slowing them down. Over the years and following the advice of 
Governor-general Corner, the Republic reconfi gured the Adriatic squadron. At 
the end of the war, in addition to seven galleys, 21 Venetian fuste/galeotte served 
in the Adriatic.
1. 3. Galleasses (Galeazze) and Sail warships
Th e last time that Venice had been fully mobilized for a naval engagement be-
fore this war was in 1619, and at the time its war fl eet consisted of one or two 
galleasses, some 50 galleys, and several dozens of sail gunships hired from north-
erners.36 Such composition of the Republic’s navy was the consequence of a 
global shift  in naval warfare. Th e shift  was marked by the rise of gun-carrying 
sail ships (caravels, bretons, galleons). Th ese ships had steadily gained domi-
nance over oar-propelled galleys and by the second half of the seventeenth cen-
tury had evolved into a completely new model of a specialized warship, the 
so-called ship-of-the-line.37 When the War for Crete broke out in 1645, the age 
of galleys and galleons was eff ectively at its end, yet both of these types still 
made the backbone of the Venetian navy fi ghting in the Levant. In 1646, as part 
of the preparations for naval operations in the Levant and in addition to the 
extensive program of arming the galleys stored in the Arsenal, the Republic 
again engaged in the project of massive hiring of galleons and merchantmen 
armed with guns, mainly Dutch and English captains. In spite of their cost,38 
these vessels, armed with 20-40 guns each, fully demonstrated their usefulness 
as early as May 1649, when the Venetian fl eet consisting of only 19 sail warships 
defeated the much larger Ottoman force of 11 sail warships, 10 galleasses and 72 
galleys. Th roughout the entire fi rst phase of the war, until the fourth battle of 
36 Galleass or galeazza was an attempt in early modern shipbuilding to keep the maneuverability and 
independence of galleys and combine it with the fi repower of sail ships. For more on 17th ct. Venetian 
galeazze see: Frederick C. Lane, Venice. A Maritime Republic. p. 374; John F. Guilmartin, Gunpowder 
and Galleys, Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the 16th Century (London: 
Conway Maritime Press, 2003) pp. 245-7, 258-9.; Alberto Tenenti, Piracy and the Decline of Venice, pp. 
132-134.
37 For a detailed survey of this trend see: John F Guilmartin, Gunpowder and Galleys, pp. 269-289. See 
also: John F. Guilmartin, Galleons and Galleys, pp. 206-213.
38 Monthly cost to hire one galleon armed with 20-30 guns amounted on the average from 1,800 to 
2,100 ducats, resulting in the yearly cost of some 21,000 – 25,000 ducats. For example see: ASVe, 
 Senato Mar, R-107, fols. 40v-42v; R-112, fols. 40v-42v, 50v-52v, 53r, 54r, 59v-61v, 114r-116r, 151r-
156v,158r-159v; ASVe, Senato Mar, R-121, fols. 29v-32v, 34r-37r, Adi 1 Marzo 1657.
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the Dardanelles (1657), between 20 and 30 of these ships served in the Venetian 
fl eet in the Levant. Still, a few galleons and armed merchantmen were also 
 deployed in the Adriatic.39
In contrast to the Aegean Sea where these ships were used chiefl y in naval enga-
gements against Ottoman vessels, in the Adriatic theater of operations these 
ships mainly supported the Venetian land force defending Dalmatian coastal 
towns. Th e Republic put its trust in these fl oating gun platforms and their fi re-
power to guard the entries into the bays of Dalmatian towns and to prevent the 
Ottomans from closing these entries and cutting off  besieged towns by placing 
gun batteries along the shore.40 Th e fi rst two of such warships (one armed mer-
chantmen and one galleon) were hired in haste and dispatched to Dalmatia in 
September 1647, during the dramatic days of the siege of Šibenik.41 Even though 
these ships arrived too late to participate in the town defense, they made an 
impression on Governor-general Foscolo who requested them for the planned, 
but never realized, expedition to Albania in winter 1647-1648. Nevertheless, 
although the Senate approved this request, in January 1648, when it became 
clear that the entire operation was compromised, in order to cut the expenses 
these ships were recalled without seeing any action.42 Th e next time sail gun-
ships were employed in the Adriatic was in 1657. Alarmed by the news of mas-
sive Ottoman preparations that were steadily reaching Zadar, in 1656 Governor-
general Antonio Zen included four “ships of war,” armed with cannons in the 
list of required reinforcements necessary for the defense of the province.43 Th e 
fi rst galleon arrived as early as June 1656, followed by two more in May 1657.44 
39 For the participation of foreign sail warships in the Venetian navy, so called Armata grossa see: 
Guido Candiani, I vascelli della Serenissima: guerra, politica e costruzioni navali a Venezia in età mod-
erna, 1650-1720 (Venezia: Istituto veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti, 2009) pp. 22-64.; Guido Candiani, 
Guido Ercole, Vascelli e fregate della Serenissima. Navi di linea della Marina veneziana 1652-1797. 
(Gruppo Modellistico Trentino, 2011) pp. 14-24.
40 For a very good description of this defensive doctrine, and discussion of the problems of defending 
Dalmatian towns and keeping the sea access to the besieged town open, see the letter of Governor-
general Antonio Bernardo entirely dedicated to this topic. ASVe, PTM. b. 481. num. 69. (Sebenico, 10. 
Decembre 1656)
41 Contract of hire of two armed merchantmen Sant’ Angelo and galleon Cornaro, for 1,200 and 1,900 
ducats respectively. ASVe, Senato Mar, R-105, f. 267r-v, Adi 2 Settembre 1647
42 ASVe, PTM. b. 465. num. 324. (Di Galea, Sebenico, 3, Ottobre 1647); ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-105, 
fols. 81r, 92v; Th e only benefi t of the service of these two ships in Dalmatia, was that Foscolo used the 
guns from one of those to arm the new fortifi cations erected in Trogir. ASVe, PTM. b. 465. num. 360. 
(Zara, 6. Gennaro 1647. m.v.)
43 ASVe, PTM. b. 479. num. 101. (Zara, 18 Marzo 1656)
44 ASVe, PTM. b. 480. num. 20. (Sebenico à 9 luglio 1656); PTM. b. 481. num. 118. (Zara, 14. Agosto 
1657)
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Th is time the reinforcements arrived on time and Governor-general Bernardo 
made a good use of them during the defense of Kotor that year. 
Infl uenced by this positive experience, for the next campaign (1658) the Senate 
destined four such vessels for the defense of Dalmatia.45 Yet meanwhile the 
 Ottoman attention had turned towards the north and Transylvania, so these 
ships saw no action in 1658. It seems that the threat of years 1656-7 left  a lasting 
mark on the Venetian command, because until the end of the war news of 
 Ottoman preparations for an attack on Kotor were cautiously matched by a dis-
patch of sail propelled warships to the Adriatic, as was for example done in 1663 
when two galleons were sent for guard duty in the Bay of Kotor.46 All in all, the 
ser vice record of this type of warships in the Adriatic remained meager, espe-
cially in regard to their high cost, and could be considered to be far from satis-
factory for the Republic policymakers. Yet the service record of the Venetian 
light galleys deployed in the Gulf was rather diff erent.
3. 4. Light Galleys (galee sottile)
Long, slim and fast, light galleys (galee sottile) for centuries represented the 
main naval weapon of the Republic. Much has been said about tactical charac-
teristics of these oar-propelled vessels and their suitability to the conditions of 
service in the Mediterranean Sea. In short, armed with up to fi ve guns at a bow, 
one of which was a heavy 50 pounder, the main siege weapon of the era, due to 
its ability to use oars and position itself into a favorable fi ring position, light 
galleys proved to be excellent tools for support of land operations, either by fi r-
ing precise salvos at shore fortifi cations or at enemy troops. Additionally, their 
maneuverability made galleys well suited for landing of assault parties and fi -
nally, last but not least, their large crews were convertible and if circumstances 
demanded could also be used on land.47 Venetian military commanders used all 
these features of galleys. Venetian navy, light galleys particularly, provided cru-
cial fi repower support both during off ensive operations (Skradin and Novigrad 
in 1647 for example) and during defense of besieged towns (like Split and Kotor 
in 1657). Yet, the full extent of galleys’ usability against shore targets was best 
seen in the Venetian attack on Ulcinj in March 1663. Th e naval squadron whose 
45 ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-33, f. 56r, Adi 28. Marzo 1658.
46 Since it quickly became clear that there was no prospect of an Ottoman attack that year, these two 
ships were discharged from duty even before the end of the campaign season at the end of July. ASVe, 
PTM. b. 491, num. 95. (Spalato, 3. Settembre 1663)
47 John F. Guilmartin, Gunpowder and Galleys, p. 75-96.; John F. Guilmartin, Gunpowder and Galleys. 
Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare in the 16th century. (London: Conway Maritime Press, 
2003) pp. 209- 268.
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core consisted of three galleys and one galeazza, aft er blockading the port of 
Ulcinj and disabling the defending artillery, continuously bombarded the port 
for almost 24 hours, destroying six Ottoman fuste captured in the port and the 
arsenal full of naval stores as well.48 Galley crews also participated in the attack 
on Knin and were even employed as additional workforce on Dalmatian fortifi -
cations, as was the case in 1656.49 
It may be the truth that the second half of the seventeenth century marked the 
coming of the age of sail and rise to dominance of the sail warships armed with 
platforms full of guns. Still, galleys represented excellent policing vessels, well 
suited to patrolling duties. As numerous examples testify, one-on-one, Ottoman 
fuste stood no chance when faced with this formidable enemy. Very oft en, 
 Ottoman fuste did not operate as an organized group, but cruised the Adriatic 
individually in order to cover as large an area as possible. Yet, by doing so they 
risked an encounter with a Venetian galley, as indeed happened on several 
 occasions, sometimes even providing the opportunity for a single galley to hunt 
for multiple enemies overcoming them one by one. In April 1661 within only a 
few days the galley Brazzana captured two fuste from Ulcinj aft er which the 
entire Ottoman force left  the Adriatic.50 
Furthermore, though a Venetian war galley was no match for a seventeenth-
century purpose-built sail warship armed with 40-60 guns, it had no problems 
overpowering an armed merchantmen carrying more than double of its fi re-
power (10-20 guns). An encounter in the northern Adriatic in December 1655 
provides a good contribution for the ongoing debate concerning the shift  in naval 
warfare. Upon receiving the news that an unknown armed ship had been spotted, 
galley Arbessana went to search for it and soon found the off ending vessel. Th e 
captain of the ship, which turned out to be an armed merchantmen (carrying 13 
guns) in the Service of the Knights of Malta, mistook the Venetian galley for an 
Ottoman fusta and gave the order for sails to be raised. Th e Venetian commander 
(correctly) interpreted this gesture as a hostile action. Aft er skillfully using its 
superior maneuverability to position his galley, the Venetian commander ordered 
three shots to be fi red. Th e fi rst shot, consisting of a heavy cannonball aimed to 
damage and slow down the enemy ship, was followed by the second shot made of 
chain-linked cannonballs, which tore down the main mast. Finally the third shot 
consisted of a canister, which incapacitated the majority of the crew on the deck. 
48 ASVe, PTM. b. 490. num. 67. (Zara, 11. Aprile 1663)
49 ASVe, PTM. b. 480. PTM. b. 480. num. 46. Spalato, 3. Ottobre 1656); num. 55. (Trau, 30. Ottobre 
1656); num. 64. (Sebenico, 21. Novembre 1656)
50 ASVe, PTM. b. 488. num. 71. (Spalato, 9 Aprile 1661)
216 Domagoj Madunić, Th e Adriatic Naval Squadron (1645-1669)...
Aft er this, the thoroughly devastated merchantmen signaled that it was ready to 
surrender, thus bringing this encounter to a quick end.51
Th e problem with light galleys was that they were in high demand also in other 
battlefi elds. Th e Senate almost always gave the priority to the Aegean battlefi elds, 
where the Republic deployed the majority of its naval forces. Th e number of gal-
leys in the Adriatic ranged from as low as one to as much as twelve, depending 
on the circumstances. Most governor-generals estimated the minimal “sensible” 
number of galleys necessary to maintain the Adriatic at three. According to the 
prevailing doctrine, one galley accompanied by about dozen armed boats was 
always to be held in the Bay of Kotor, one was to be positioned in the center of 
the province, in the waters between Split and Trogir, and one galley was to be 
stationed at Zadar, to serve as the strategic reserve at the disposal of Governor-
general.52 In reality, the number of galleys serving in the Adriatic was rather fl uid 
(see Table 1). Th ough the number of light galleys serving was usually kept at the 
bare minimum, when some major military engagement was expected in Dalmatia 
the Republic was ready to commit a larger number of galleys to this theater of 
operations. For the expedition to Albania in 1649, of which the Senate had high 
expectations, the task force of no less than 12 galleys was assembled. Similarly, 
when a major Ottoman off ensive was expected in Dalmatia in 1657, the Republic 
deployed nine galleys in the Adriatic. However, on average between three and six 
galleys were usually available for duty in the Adriatic.
In addition to the strictly combat duties mentioned above, galleys were also em-
ployed for a wide range of other tasks that could take them away from their regu-
lar services. Most commonly, a galley was dispatched from Dalmatia to Venice to 
collect provisions of specie needed for payment of the Republic’s forces in the 
province. Galleys were also oft en used as transport ships to transfer troops from 
Dalmatia to Corfu or Ionian Islands. Galleys destined for voyage to Corfu could 
be expected to return within sensible time, but those sent further were usually 
ordered to remain with the main fl eet in the Levant, and were thus lost for gov-
ernor-generals in Zadar. For the Venetian Republic, the galley was not just a war-
ship but also a symbol of the state power. As such, galleys, including those serving 
in the Adriatic, were also used for a multitude of ceremonial duties. Every arrival 
of a Republic’s magistrate- not just of governor-generals - in the province repre-
sented a public event and part of the standard decorum was for them to arrive 
into the place of service aboard a Republic’s galleys. And, whenever possible, an 
51 ASVe, PTM. b 480. num. 59. (Trau, 15. Novembre 1656) attachment: report from the hearing of the 
merchantmen captain.
52 For example see: ASVe, PTM. b. 472. num. 10. (Zara, 30. Giugno 1652)
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additional eff ort was put into maintaining this protocol. For example, in March 
1651, during the stay of Governor-general Foscarini in Trogir, the new extraordi-
nary governor of Trogir and Split also arrived into the area aboard a sail ship. Th is 
moved Governor-general Foscarini, in order to “upkeep the dignity of this service 
in the town so close to the enemy,” to relinquish his own galley to the extraordi-
nary governor for his ceremonial entry into Split.53 
Such non-combat offi  cial duties could also take galleys away from Dalmatian 
 waters. For example, whenever a galley for transfer of governors to Corfu or 
“Th ree Islands” was not available in Venice, one of the galleys from Dalmatia 
would be recalled and assigned to this task. Such tasks usually occupied the galley 
for one or two months, depending primarily on the pace of preparations for the 
departure of a designated magistrate from Venice.54 Equally, a departing Gover-
nor-general and his staff  would also return to Venice the same way as they had 
arrived - aboard a galley.55 Among other “ceremonial” duties that resulted in re-
moval of a galley from its standard duties in the Adriatic for a long period of time, 
was the task of transporting the Republic’s envoys to Istanbul. Moreover, although 
the return of a Governor-general to Venice provided an opportunity to send some 
of the weakest vessels to be refi tted there, this important duty could sometimes 
take away some of the best galleys from the Adriatic squadron too.56 All in all, it 
was not uncommon that, because of these secondary duties, the number of the 
galleys in service in the Adriatic would even fall to one, to the great annoyance of 
the governor-generals.57 Probably the most dramatic example in this regard are the 
events from April 1667, when in the days immediately aft er the terrible earth-
quake that devastated Ragusa and Kotor the Governor-general Catherino Cornaro 
did not have a single galley at his disposal in Zadar.58
Th e crew of a fully armed Venetian galley consisted of ca 290 men, some 200 of 
whom were oarsmen, 48 armed soldiers of marine infantry, while the rest were 
53 ASVe, PTM. b. 471. num. 12. (Trau, 24. Marzo 1651)
54 In 1661, for example, galley Magna was recalled to Venice to serve for the transport of the Governor-
general of “Th e Th ree Islands.” ASVe, PTM. b. 488, num. 91. (Spalato, 12. Settembre 1661)
55 Occasionally and to the great frustration of a current Governor-general, this service could take two 
galleys away from Dalmatia. Th is happened in February 1652 and 1660, when Governor-generals 
Girolamo Foscarini and Antonio Bernardo left  Dalmatia for Venice. ASVe, PTM. b. 474. num. 15. (Di 
Spalato, 22. Febraro 1652 m.v.); PTM. b. 487. num. 3. (Zara, 22. Marzo 1660)
56 Such was the case with galley Cornera in October 1652, which was charged with the duty of trans-
port of extraordinary Ambassador Capello to Istanbul. ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-26, f. 180v, Adi 5 Ot-
tobre 1652; ASVe, PTM. b. 473, num. 143, (Zara, 21 Ottobre 1652)
57 For example see: ASVe, PTM. 472, num. 110 (Zara, 30. Giugno 1652.)
58 ASVe, PTM. b. 497. num. 209. (Zara, 5. Aprile 1667.), num. 210. (Zara, 12. Aprile 1667.); Grga 
Novak, “Mletački izvori o potresu u Dubrovniku i Kotoru 6. travnja god. 1667 [Venetian sources 
concerning the earthquake in Ragusa and Kotor],” Starine 55 (1972): p. 8.
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various specialists: gunners, carpenters, a surgeon, an oar master, wood workers 
etc. (for a detailed structure of the Venetian light galley crew in this period see 
Appendix 1). For the crews of merchantmen or smaller Ottoman fusta, the pros-
pect of being boarded by some 250 men was a suffi  cient reason to give up the 
fi ght and try to fi nd salvation either in outright surrender or attempt to escape 
by jumping into sea. However, these large crews, which represented one of the 
main advantages of galleys, were also their major drawback. When the strength 
of a galley crew would fall below a certain number, a galley would become un-
able to move and thus would practically be rendered useless. 
Galleys were extremely sensitive to outbreaks of epidemics among their crews, 
especially among the rowers, who due to the very harsh conditions of their 
service (exposure to heat during summer and cold winds and rain in fall and 
winter), combined with malnutrition, were very susceptible to various diseases. 
Th e following examples provide good illustration of the eff ects the epidemic 
outbreaks could have had on galley crews. In June 1653, immediately upon the 
arrival of galley Trona in Zadar, its captain and 40 rowers were so sick that they 
needed to be admitted into hospital. Th e galley was anchored in the port until 
they were cured.59 Even more striking was the case of galley Civrana, which in 
December 1655 arrived in Zadar aft er a long and hard winter voyage. Upon 
docking, 48 of its rowers, who had fallen sick during this single voyage, were 
immediately dispatched to hospital. Moreover, since the galley had already lost 
55 crewmen during the previous campaign season (the overwhelming majority 
of them rowers), its crew was reduced to barely 99 men or 40% of its full strength, 
making the galley completely incapable of sea service.60 Probably one of the 
most dramatic example dates from the campaign season of 1658. At the begin-
ning of the year the Republic had dispatched four newly armed galleys to the 
Adriatic, yet as early as August the state of these galleys was deplorable. A total 
of 168 crew members were dead and further 113 were hospitalized, bringing 
total losses to 281 men, or almost 25% of the crews, lost during a single cam-
paign season.61 
Th ough this last example may seem rather extreme, it was not that extraordinary. 
Th e Table 2 below contains data compiled from several muster records of galleys 
serving in the Adriatic. It shows that the galley crews were, on average, at 75-83% 
of their full strength. An extensive loss suff ered during a single season, such as 
59 ASVe, PTM. b. 474. num. 44. (Di Zara, 1. Giugno 1653);
60 ASVe, PTM. b. 478. num. 80. (Zara, 7. Decembre 1655)
61 ASVe, PTM. b. 483. num. (num. 207. Spalato, 25 Agosto 1658) attachment: Nota delli morti et in-
fermi delle Galere.
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those during 1658, could partially be attributed to a more demanding campaign, 
but probably even more to malnutrition, inexperience and maladjustment of the 
newly formed crews to the conditions of life aboard the war galley. In 1658, Gov-
ernor-general Antonio Bernardo off ered to the Senate the following explanation 
for the deplorable state of the above mentioned galley crews:
Ne da altro è derrivata la loro caduta, se non per la mutatione, dalla vita de co-
modi (secondo le conditioni di ogni uno) à quella delle pene di una Galera; 
venendo sotto clima più calido, non usi al tormento del remo, ne del mare; A che 
si [12] aggionge l’affl  ittione dell’ animo, che li prostituisce di abandonarli disper-
atamente, come persi.62
Several cases show that aft er initial losses, the core of veteran crew members 
adjusted to conditions of the sea service would form and the crew strength 
would stabilize. Moreover, galley crews recruited solely from Venetian subjects 
from the Terraferma compared to those armed with population from Dalma-
tian islands provide arguments in favor of the hypothesis that inexperience 
and maladjustment to the conditions of the sea service could have dire conse-
quences to the state of a galley crew. Galley Bergamesca, armed with a crew 
from inland Bergamo who had had little or no experience in the sea service, 
by May 1647 had lost a majority of its crew and was docked in the Zadar 
harbor.63 By contrast, two Dalmatian galleys, Brazzana and Arbessana, armed 
in 1646 (named aft er the island communities of Brač and Rab responsible for 
manning these galleys),64 remained in service for the entire duration of the 
war and gave a very good account of their service. Never during the war there 
was recorded a sharp decrease in the strength of the crews of these two gal-
leys, manned with islanders well accustomed to the conditions and hardships 
of sea service.65 Even though, when in 1653 galley Brazzana was rearmed (be-
cause its worn out hull was no longer seaworthy), it lacked l 118 crew mem-
bers, this, however, was a consequence of almost seven years of uninterrupted 
service. Moreover, since the galley served so close to its home, many of the 
missing crewmen should be considered as fugitives who simply had enough 
of the war and went home.
62 Ibid.
63 ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 248. (Di Galera Almissa, 27. Maggio 1647); num. 278. (Zara, 27. Luglio 
1647.)
64 ASVe, ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-17, f. 51v-52r, Adi 2 Marzo 1646; Senato Mar, R-104, fols. 74v-75r. A 
di 6 Aprile 1646.
65 See: ASVe, PTM. b. 473. num. 119. (Zara, 25 Luglio 1652); ASVe, PTM. b. 474. num. 30. (Di Zara, 
24. Aprile 1653)
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Table 2. Strength and structure of the Adriatic squadron galley crews.66
1646. 
February 1649. May 1659. July 1660. March
1668. 
February
Num. % Num. % Num. % Num. % Num. %
Galleys at muster 6 8 6 3 3
Nominal crew 
strength 1748 100 2328 100 1746 100 874 100 873 100
Total crew present 1324 75.74 1902 81,70 1460 83.62 663 75.86 - -
Total crew 
missing 424 24.26 426 18,30 286 16.38 211 24.14 - -
Galoetti nominal 
strength 1200 100 - - 1200 100 600 100 600 100
Galeotti present 928 77.33 - - 1145 95.42 529 88.17 539 89.83
Galeotti missing 278 23.17 - - 55 4.58 71 11.83 61 10.17
Structure of the galeotti
Freemen 
(zontavoli) 883 95.15 - - 671 58.60 398 75.24 224 41.56
Convicts 
(condenati) 5 0.54 - - 448 39.13 123 23.25 285 52.88
Others 40 4.31 - - 0 0 6 1.13 5 0.93
Ottoman 
prisoners (Turchi) 0 0 - - 26 2.27 2 0.38 58 10.76
Dalmatia was one of the traditional recruiting grounds for Venetian galleys and 
this war was no exception to this practice. Th ough the number of armed pro-
vincial galleys during this war was only two, the level of mobilization of local 
population for galley service was extremely high. During the War for Crete gal-
ley service was not limited to only one or two campaigns, as in the days of the 
War of Cyprus (1570-1573) when no fewer than eight Dalmatian galleys were 
armed,67 but spanned over two and a half decades, resulting in a continuous 
drain on local populations. Over the years, the task of maintaining two provin-
cial galleys (Brazzana and Arbessana) well armed with crews began to represent 
66 Th e number of galleys recorded in this table does not represent the total number of galleys serving 
in the Adriatic, only the number of those present at musters. Data taken from the following galley 
musters: ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 216. (Zara, 11. Marzo 1647); ASVe, PTM. b. 468, num. 565. (Zara, 
10. Maggio 1649); ASVe, PTM. b. 485, num. 257 (Spalato, 28. Luglio 1659); ASVe, PTM. b. 487. num. 
3. (Zara, 22. Marzo 1660); ASVe, PTM. b. 498. num. 35. (Zara, 5 Febraro 1667. m.v.)
67 For more see: Grga Novak ed. Lepantska bitka: udio hrvatskih pomoraca u Lepantskoj bitki 1571. 
godine [Battle of Lepanto: patricipation of Croatian mariners in the battle of Lepanto] (Zadar: Jugo-
slavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti. Institut u Zadru, 1974) pp. 261-2.
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too heavy a burden for these two island communities. Consequently, the Repub-
lic was forced to expand the obligation to provide men for galley crews also to 
the islands of Korčula and Hvar.68 Furthermore, in 1647, the Republic planned 
to put into service also a galley of the town of Šibenik, yet imminent Ottoman 
danger and the need to defend the town put this project temporarily on hold.69 
However, aft er the plague heavily decimated the town and its countryside the 
plan was completely discarded. 
In addition to the two Dalmatian galleys that for the entire duration of the war 
served almost exclusively in the Adriatic, hundreds of Dalmatians also ended up 
serving aboard galleys in the Levant. Th e seat of the Venetian administration in 
Dalmatia, the town of Zadar, and the islands of its littoral were burdened with one 
of the heaviest duties: to provide rowers for the galley of Captain-general of the 
sea. During the fi rst few years, levying of men for this duty went without any 
serious problems. Every few years, when a new Governor-general set forth toward 
the Levant, some 100 or 150 men would be levied for his galleys in Zadar. How-
ever, since those who left  for the Levant almost never returned, the fi rst diffi  culties 
in fi nding men for this service began to appear by 1650.70 When the next order to 
gather 150 men for this duty arrived in Zadar in July 1651, Governor-general 
Girolamo Foscarini informed the Senate that he was approached by representa-
tives of the community of the Zadar islands. Th ey inquired if it would be possible 
for them to replace those selected for galley service with Ottoman prisoners or 
slaves bought from the Morlacchi. Aft er pondering the issue for some time, 
 Foscarini decreed that only freemen could serve aboard the galley of captain-
general; however, prisoners could be used to staff  other galleys with the substi-
tuted freemen transferred to the galley of the captain-general.71 How eff ective was 
this policy is unknown, yet by 1655, when the next contingent of 150 rowers was 
requested, Governor-general Zen informed the Senate that the manpower pool of 
the islands was almost completely exhausted. Zen wrote to his superiors that the 
situation was such that at the fi rst rumor of this order, the remaining men eligible 
for service were ready to either hide or fl ee, some even to the Ottoman lands.72 
68 In 1650 obligations of these communities were formalized. and in order to To avoid misuses of local 
galley commanders, the recruitment of galley reinforcements was allowed only with an explicit order 
of the Senate. ASVe, Senato Mar, R-110, f. 175r-176r, Adi 18 Giugno, e 13 Luglio 1650,
69 Governor-general Foscolo informed the Senate concerning the diffi  culty to execute this order in the 
following letter: ASVe, PTM. b. 464. num. 229. (Zara, 9. Aprile 1647)
70 In March 1650, Governor-general Foscolo informed the Senate about the diffi  culties in gathering 
the reinforcement of 100 rowers for the galley of the Captain-General of the Sea. ASVe, PTM. b. 470. 
num. 688. (Zara, 18. Marzo 1650)
71 ASVe, PTM. b. 471. num. 48. (Zara, 10. Agosto 1651)
72 ASVe, PTM.b 477, num. 21. (Spalato, 22. Marzo, 1655)
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However, the Senate continued to draw on this resource and in March 1657 
even planned to arm an entire new galley with crewmen from Zadar and its 
district. Governor-general Bernardo informed the Senate of the strong opposi-
tion of the local population to this initiative: since up to that time, some 500 
men had left  for the Levant and only a few had returned.73 In spite of Governor-
general Bernardo’s doubts, the Senate decided to press forward with this plan. 
Over the following months, Bernardo managed to conscript prospective mem-
bers of the crew for the new galley, but only aft er conceding to the demands of 
the local population that the galley was to serve only in the Adriatic. Th is new 
levy had completely exhausted the provincial resources and when in October 
1657 a new order for the conscription of 150 rowers came to Zadar, Bernardo 
was forced to send armed boats to collect the prospective conscripts. Yet the 
boats returned with only four men because the rest had fl ed at the fi rst sight of 
Venetian vessels.74 Th e next attempt to gather reinforcements for the crew of the 
Captain-general in March 1658 also yielded similar result; at the fi rst news of 
the arrival of Venetian ships sent to collect conscripts for galleys, the remaining 
inhabitants of the islands and the Zadar countryside took cover and the pre-
scribed quotas of the crewmen simply could not be gathered.75
Th e statement that the galley service was extremely unpopular, at this point at 
least, needs no further support. As told above, due to the high casualty rates 
over the years it had become more and more diffi  cult to fi nd those willing to 
serve aboard the Republic’s galleys, not only in Dalmatia but also on the Ter-
raferma. Th is resulted in a fundamental change in the structure of the galley 
crews, which can be noted in the sample data collected in the Table 2 above. 
While convicts made less than 1% of the crews of the six galleys presented at 
the muster in March 1646, their number steadily rose so that at the muster of 
the six galleys held in July 1659 they constituted almost 40% of the crews. In 
order to compensate for the lack of its own manpower, the Republic resorted to 
manning the galleys with convicts, even before this war.76 In that regard, the 
data from the Table 2 can be interpreted as a sure indicator of how the war gave 
additional impetus to this trend that had been on the rise for some time.77
73 ASVe, PTM. b. 481. num. 87. (Zara, 4 Marzo 1657)
74 ASVe, PTM. b. 482. n. 140. (Lesina, 16. Novembre 1657)
75 ASVe, PTM. b. 482. num. 158. (Zara, 15. Febraro 1657 mv)
76 Alberto Tenenti, Piracy and the Decline of Venice, pp. 112-113.
77 Compare: Luca lo Basso, “Il Mestiere del Remo nell’ Armata Sottile Veneziana: Coscrizione, Debito, 
Pena e Schiavitu (Secc. CVI-XVIII),” Studi Veneziani 48, (2004): pp.113-115.
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3. 5. Expansion of the Command Hierarchy
By July 1647 (see Table 1) the Republic had concentrated in the Adriatic a 
 respectable naval force consisting of seven galleys and more than 30 barche 
 armate, with a clear tendency to increase its strength even more. However, exist-
ing peace-time command hierarchy was inadequate for effi  cient running of this 
enlarged naval force, especially in the circumstances of major armed confl ict. 
Aware of this shortcoming, in July 1646 the Senate appointed the governor of 
Pula in Istria, Gabriel Zorzi, as the Extraordinary governor of the Gulf (Provvedi-
tore Estraordinario in Golfo), charging him with the command of all galleys and 
armed boats serving in the Adriatic. Additionally, Governor in the gulf was also 
granted a seat on war councils (so called consulta), yet in this, like in all other 
aff airs, he was to be subordinated to the Governor-general in Zadar.78 By intro-
ducing this new post of the operative commander through which Governor-
general in Zadar could direct and coordinate actions of the fl eet with the op-
erations of the Venetian land forces, the Senate both greatly increased command 
and control over its forces in the region, and signifi cantly eased the burden of 
directing the Republic’s war eff ort in this battlefi eld for governor-generals.
As in the case of other extraordinary offi  ces introduced in the course of this war 
(for example Commissario in Provintia), this offi  ce was not occupied for the 
entire duration of the confl ict. Between 1650 and 1654, when the shift  of the 
Republic’s strategic focus to the Levant directed majority of its forces to the 
Eastern Mediterranean battlefi elds, the post was left  vacant. However, increased 
Ottoman corsair activity in the Adriatic prompted the Senate to renew this com-
mand post. Accordingly, in April 1654, Alvise Civrano was elected as the Ex-
traordinary governor in the Gulf with the main task of persecution of Ottoman 
corsairs and keeping the Adriatic safe for navigation.79 Until the end of the war 
this post was occupied and governors of the Gulf cruised the southern Adriatic 
area between Ancona, Kotor and Ulcinj in search for Ottoman corsairs. In that 
period, governors of the Gulf had under their command a separate squadron 
numbering 1-2 galleys accompanied by several smaller vessels, fuste, galeotte or 
armed boats.80 Th e base of operations of this squadron were the islands of 
Korčula and Hvar, the shipyard and arsenal of which provided necessary 
 supportive infrastructure for this force.
78 ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-17, f. 171v-172v, Adi 19. Luglio 1646.; Compare also Sassi I., p. 239.
79 ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-28, f. 67v, Adi 15. Aprile 1654; f. 76r-v, Adi 23. Aprile 1654; ASVe, PTM. b. 
475. num. 122. (Zara, 27. Aprile 1654); PTM. b. 476. num. 136. (Zara, 14. Giugno 1654)
80 ASVe, PTM. b. 475. num. 122. (Zara, 27. Aprile 1654)
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Introduction of the Extraordinary governor in the Gulf, was not the only change 
in the command structure introduced during this war. As was mentioned previ-
ously, all smaller warships were manned by the companies of Croatian and Al-
banian infantry, which represented the spine of the Republic’s naval forces in the 
Adriatic. Th e nominal strength of a company of Croatian or Albanian81 infantry 
was 50 men, including its command core consisting of a captain, an ensign and 
a sergeant.82 As such, it was suffi  cient to arm all types of smaller warships, except 
larger galeotte (small galleys) or fuste which required two such companies. Un-
like the rest of the Venetian land forces, companies of Croatian and Albanian 
infantry were not organized in larger military formations (regiments) but func-
tioned as independent or “stand-alone” units; meaning, that their captains were 
subordinated directly to the Venetian commander/magistrate charged with the 
command of military forces in the place of their service.
Obviously, commanding and coordinating the actions of several dozen “stand-
alone” companies and ships would be highly impractical, especially during war-
time. In order to address this issue even before the war, a special command post 
above the level of captain, with the title of governatore di Militie Albanese or 
Croate was established in this branch of the Venetian military. Th is “ethnic” title 
denoted a commander in charge of several companies of marine infantry  serving 
aboard the armed boats. Oft en these companies were recruited by the  commander 
himself. In addition to social prestige, and military rank, this title  usually (but 
not always) brought also a small stipend, ranging from 6-12 ducats, depending 
on the merit and status of the particular individual.83 
Even so, the rise of the number of companies of Croats and Albanians serving 
aboard armed boats to more than 50 during 1646-7, underlined the need for more 
effi  cient coordination of their actions. Th is operational requirement consequently 
led to the creation of a new command post above the level of governatore. In July 
1648, the Senate sent to Dalmatia an experienced and proven commander, Caval-
liere Niccolo Delimarcovich (Nikola Delimarković), with the title of Colonel of the 
81 Albanians and Montenegrins (both were recorded in the Venetian sources under the same name that 
is Albanians) in the Venetian military service have been extensively researched. In addition to the previ-
ously listed studies, see also: Lovorka Čoralić, ‘Benemerita nazione’: albanski vojnici i časnici u Zadru 
(XVI.-XVIII. st.) [‘Benemerita nazione’: Albanian Soldiers and Offi  cers in Zadar],” Zbornik Odsjeka za 
povijesne znanosti Zavoda za povijesne i društvene znanosti HAZU 27, (2009): pp. 121-164.
82 ASVe, PTM. b. 500. num. 122. (Zara, 30. Settembre 1668) attachment dated: Adi 30. Settembre 
1668.
83 For example see the decrees granting the title of governatore: ASVe, Senato Mar, R-104, f. 242v, Adi 
15 Settembre 1646.; R-106, f. 80v, Adi 2. Marzo 1648.; R-113, f. 53v-54r, Adi 13. Marzo 1652.; R-113, 
f. 102v-103r, Adi 19. Aprile 1652.;
Povijesni prilozi 45., 199-235 (2013.) 225
Croatian nation (Collonelo della natione Crovata) and assigned to him a yearly 
stipend of 500 ducats. Although his title referred to him as the colonel of Croats 
only, Delimarcovich was in charge of all companies of armed boats, Croat or 
 Albanian.84 Aft er Delimarcovich had been killed in combat in July 1653, he was 
succeeded by Vuco Cernizza (Vuk Črnica-Orlandić), whose title was adjusted (to 
refl ect his actual authority) to that of collonelo delli Nationi Crovata, et Albanese.85 
Th e arrival of colonel Delimarcovich, coincided with the introduction of the offi  ce 
of sergeant-major of the armed boats, a post to which Governor-general Foscolo 
appointed colonel’s nephew, captain Zorzi Delimarcovich.86 With the introduction 
of these two posts, the Republic fi nished organizing companies of the armed boats 
serving in the Adriatic into a single corps resembling a regiment.
4. Maintaining and Supplying Adriatic Squadron
Every year, the Republic’s warships serving in Adriatic required dozens of smaller 
repairs, seasonal maintenance works, replacement of broken or used parts etc., 
and the main facility that kept this fl eet operational was the arsenal in Zadar. Th e 
arsenals of the Stato da Mar were specialized depots of naval stores, weapons, am-
munition, and various spare parts. Th eir role was to support the operations of the 
Venetian navy by providing ships in transit with facilities for limited repair-work 
and replenishing consumed materials (ropes, oars, hardware, wood) and ammuni-
tion (cannon balls, gunpowder). As such, arsenals were essential for the Republic’s 
ability to project its naval power. Venice organized an unbroken chain of such 
facilities through its maritime possessions, stretching from Zadar and Hvar to 
Corfu, and ending with two arsenals on Crete, at Candia and Canea.87
84 ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-20, f. 188v-189r, Adi 25. Luglio 1648.
85 ASVe, PTM. b,474, num. 53. (Di Zara, 17. Giugno 1653); ASVe, PTM. b. 475. num. 118. (Zara, 14. 
Aprile 1654); See also appointment of Marco Cernizza, brother of Vuco, as his successor at this post: 
ASVe, PTM. b. 489. num. 20. (Spalato, 28. Agosto 1662); For more on the well-known person of Vuco 
Cernizza (Vuk Črnica-Orlandić) Conte di Montenegro see: Gligor Stanojević, “Crna Gora u doba 
kandiskog rata (1645-1669) [Montenegro in the Age of the War for Crete (1645-1669)],” Istorijski 
glasnik 1-2 (1953):, pp. 25-29.; Gligor Stanojević, Jugoslovenske zemlje, pp. 208.-209.; Dragoje Živković, 
Istorija crnogorskog naroda [History of the Montenegro People], vol. 2. (Cetinje, 1992) pp. 25.-29.; Lo-
vorka Čoralić and Savo Marković, Crmnič ani u mletač kim dokumentima XVII st. [Family Cernica in 
Venetian Documents] (Bar: MVPrint, 2004) pp. 79-92.
86 Th e appointment took a place upon the Colonel’s arrival in Dalmatia in July 1648, yet two years 
later the Senate had still not confi rmed it, so Colonel, through the mediation of Governor-general 
Foscolo, sent a petition to the Senate. ASVe, PTM. b. 470, num. 726. (Zara, 25. Luglio 1650)
87 For more on the development of colonial arsenals and their role in Venetian defensive policy see: 
Ruthy Gertwagen, “Th e Venetian Colonies in the Ionian and Aegean Seas in Venetian defense Policy 
in the Fift eenth Century” Journal of Mediterranean Studies 12, num. 2. (2002): pp. 164-171.
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Even though it is true that “the importance of a particular city of Stato da Mar 
was clearly marked by presence or lack of the arsenal,”88 arsenals were not of uni-
form size, nor did they provide the same set of services. Among the arsenals of 
Stato da Mar, those at Crete were the largest and were also capable of constructing 
new galleys and fuste, thus resembling the most the famous Venetian arsenal. Th e 
arsenal’s scope was in accordance with the role these ports at Crete played as the 
bases of the Republic’s main fl eet during its operations in Eastern Mediterranean.89 
Similarly, the size of the Zadar arsenal at the other end of the chain refl ected the 
role Zadar played in Venice’s overall naval strategy. Zadar was not the main naval 
base of the Republic in the Adriatic, this was the role of Venice. Instead, since 
Zadar served as an operational base of a much smaller fl eet, the Adriatic squad-
ron, its facilities were scaled to match the needs (refi tting, minor repairs, yearly 
maintenance) of this fl eet, in addition to its main function as the service facility 
for the Republic’s ships in transit to and from the Levant.90 Th e same was the case 
with the arsenal at Hvar, the smallest of the Adriatic arsenals. Th e island of Hvar 
was a major transit port and shelter for ships sailing along the Venice-Levant 
course; consequently its Arsenal served as a naval depot where ships in transit 
could be refi tted and their stores replenished.
For the entire duration of the war, from early spring till the late fall, ships of the 
Adriatic squadrons were in constant service at sea, either searching for Ottoman 
corsairs or guarding posts exposed to Ottoman attacks. Like any other tool or 
instrument that is in continuous use, Venetian warships were prone to deterio-
ration and breakage and consequently in need of repair and maintenance. Since 
the Republic had at its disposal facilities of the Zadar arsenal, the majority of 
necessary repairs were undertaken there. When, due to prolonged use, some 
vessel was beyond repair, it was disarmed, either in Zadar with its usable parts 
stored in the local arsenal, or sent to Venice for the same purpose. At the same 
time the Senate would order the magistrates of the Arsenal in Venice to trans-
port a replacement vessel to Dalmatia. 
Th e replacements for galleys and armed boats were sent from Venice as ship hulls 
provisioned with all necessary equipment and seaworthy, but still not fully assem-
88 Michela Dal Borgo and Gugliemo Zanelli, Zara. Una fortezza, un porto, un arsenale (secoli XV-
XVIII). (Roma: Viella, 2008) p. 38. 
89 Elisabetta Molteni, La scienza del fortifi care, pp. 212.
90 For more on the development and expansion of the arsenal in Zadar during the period of Venetian 
rule see: Michela Dal Borgo and Gugliemo Zanelli, Zara. Una fortezza, un porto, un arsenale, pp. 39-
47.; Antonija Mlikota, “Arsenal u Zadru – Povijest, funkcija i revitalizacija [Arsenal in Zadar – His-
tory, Function and its Revitalization],” Radovi Zavoda za povijesne znanosti HAZU u Zadru 52, (2010): 
pp. 205-230.
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bled. Once the hull reached Zadar, it would be assembled there and the old crew 
would take the ship over. Such hulls were in the case of galleys called arsili, and 
in the case of armed boats corpi. During the transport, hulls were operated by 
skeleton crews and whenever possible the Republic grouped such vessels before 
dispatching them to Dalmatia or to the Levant. For example, in July 1652, one 
galley arsilo and six corpi di barche armate were sent as a group to Dalmatia. To 
increase the security of this transport, the Senate also allocated one company of 
marine infantry aboard these vessels.91 Similarly, in 1659 six corpi of armed vessels 
were ordered to be shipped to Dalmatia.92 Th e extent of dilapidation, to which 
patrolling the Adriatic in search of Ottoman corsairs could reduce the Venetian 
naval forces, is aptly illustrated in a letter from Governor-general Girolamo Con-
tarini from October 1662. Contarini informed the Senate that almost one half of 
small galleys or fuste under his command were unusable and that a shipment of 
14 corpi of gallotte is necessary in order to replace worn out vessels.93
In order to keep Zadar arsenal operational and able to perform its functions, it 
was necessary to keep it well provided with suffi  cient quantities of naval stores and 
materials for ship construction. At the time, the manufacturing capacities of the 
province were practically non-existent, so all necessary material had to be shipped 
from Venice each year. As inventory lists show, keeping the naval force of 3-6 
 galleys and of some 30-40 smaller vessels operational (galleotte, fuste, barche ar-
mate) required every year some fi ve metric tons of tar, 50,000 nails of various 
sizes, alongside with 3-5 galley sails, 20-25 sails for smaller vessels, 1-3 galley 
masts, 20-25 masts for barche armate, 50 oars for galleys and 400-500 oars for 
barche armate and dozens of other ship parts.94 Another important item that also 
regularly found its place on lists of demands for equipment and armaments sent 
from Dalmatia were artillery pieces, needed to replace worn out and useless ship 
guns and cannons. For example, in 1656 Governor-general Antonio Zen asked the 
Senate for prompt shipment of 15 periere necessary to rearm armed boats.95 It is 
not possible to estimate the yearly value of these shipments, yet the available data 
91 ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-26, f. 123r, Adi 24 Luglio 1652; ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-26, f. 133v, Adi 9 
Agosto 1652.
92 ASVe, Senato Rettori, R-34, f. 111v-112r, Adi 31 Maggio 1659.
93 ASVe, PTM. b. 489, num. 34. (Spalato, 22. Ottobre 1662) attachment: Nota da nuovi arsili di galeotte 
con gli armizzi et armi che occorrano.
94 For example, the inventory lists with the requested materials and the needs of the Zadar arsenal can 
be found in: ASVe, PTM. b. 473. num. 113. (Zara, 4 Luglio 1652) attachment: Nota di bisogni di Arse-
nal di Zara; PTM. b. 475. num. 103. (Zara, 20. Genaro 1653. mv.) attachment: Notta delle robbe che 
furono ricercate in Publico per bisogno di questo Arsenale et prima; PTM. b. 479, num. 107. (Zara, 23 
Aprile 1656) attachment: Nota de remi da Galea, Barc’ armate, et altro per Arsenal di Zara.
95 ASVe, PTM. 479. num. 98. (Zara, 14. Marzo 1656)
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allow an estimate concerning the value of particular items. For example: the 500 
oars needed every year totaled 3,000 lire (c.a 480 ducats, six lire each), the mast for 
the galley was priced at 90 ducats, while that of the armed boat at 11 ducats.96
However, as far as ship crews were concerned, the most important provision was 
woolen cloth (rassa) used for manufacturing the canvas (tenda) used by crews 
for protection from adverse weather in fall and winter, and hot sun in summer. 
Lack of these, especially during fall and winter months, was a constant source 
of suff ering for ship crews and frustration for governor-generals. Th e latter at-
tributed high losses among crews of the galleys and other armed vessels (see 
previous section) mainly to this defect. Th e following paragraph illustrates a 
theme commonly found in letters of governor-generals: 
Also, the provision of canvases is necessary for the preservation of poor crews [of the 
galleys], and the men of armed boats; the sooner these arrive, the more appropriate 
and profi table it will be, since without them [the crews] cannot resist these winds and 
rain, and [will] succumb to miseries [of the service] and lose their lives.97 
Be that as it may, because of conditions of sea service, ships required replace-
ment of their tende every year. Table 3 below contains an account compiled in 
September 1654, concerning the requirements of rassa (wool cloth) needed to 
manufacture tende for the Republic’s warships serving in the gulf at that time. 
Unfortunately for the ship crews, the problem of replacing worn out canvases 
for the Republic’s warships was not properly solved until the end of the war. If 
anything, as the years passed, the situation only worsened.
Table 3. Account of the yearly needs of rassa for ship tende, from September 1654.98




Total amount of brazza 




Brigantino 150 5 750
Post offi  ce Caichio 130 3 390
Light galley (Galera 
sotile)
850 5 4.250
Yearly requirements of wool cloth (rassa) for manufacture of 
tende:
12.410
96 DAZ, Atti di Provveditori Generali, Lunardo Foscolo vol. 16, fols. 213r, 217r.
97 Anco per la preservatione delle povere ciurme, et gente di Barc’ armate neccessaria è la proviggione di 
Tendi, che quanto prima capitaranno, tanto piu riusciranno proprie, et profi ttevoli, mentre all’ ingiurie 
di venti, et piogge di questa maniera resister non possono, et ceder convengono à pattimenti con la 
perdita della vita. ASVe, PTM. b. 465, num. 329. (Zara, 13, Ottobre 1647)
98 Wool cloth (rassa) was measured in brazza, a Venetian measure used for cloth, equivalent in length 
to 0.606 m. ASVe, PTM. b. 476. num. 159. (Zara, 16. Settembre 1654) attachment: Nota de bisogni del 
Monitioner de Zara; See also: ASVe, PTM. b. 465. num. 335. (Zara, 27. Ottobre 1647)
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Th e last measure aiming to somehow remedy the constant shortage of canvas 
for armed boats, fuste and small galleys was introduced in December 1665. It 
clearly shows how exhausted by the prolonged war the Republic had become. In 
1665, a total of 25 small galleys served in the Adriatic and by winter season each 
of them required new canvas. In order to provide new canvases for these ships, 
5,000 brazza of rassa was needed (200 brazza per vessel), yet the Senate ordered 
provision of only 900 to be sent to Dalmatia, of which just 600 brazza reached 
Zadar. In such circumstances Governor-general Catherino Cornaro, was forced 
to introduce one rather unpopular measure. Tende of the light galleys, which 
had priority over all other ships, were regularly replaced each year, and it was 
customary that their sopracomitti were allowed to keep old used tende for them-
selves in order to sell them and compensate at least for part of the large debts 
they were owed on the account of their salaries. Yet, the Governor-general 
Cornaro was forced to abolish this practice and to decree that all old, replaced 
light galleys tende were to be deposited in the arsenal and used as material for 
manufacturing new tende for galeotte. According to Cornaro’s calculation four 
smaller tende for galeotte could be made from one light galley tende.99 Th ough 
in this way replacement tende for a dozen smaller warships were secured, the 
success of this measure remained limited and the pleas for rassa continued to 
arrive in Venice from Dalmatia until the end of the war.
5. Conclusion
In the end, it can be argued that the performance of the Adriatic squadron dur-
ing this war was satisfactory. Th ough the Ottoman corsairs in the Adriatic did 
manage to capture considerable number of prizes, for the entire duration of this 
confl ict the squadron maintained fi rm control over maritime lanes of commu-
nication through the Adriatic. It secured a constant fl ow of men, equipment and 
supplies to the Levant. Additionally, unchallenged control of the sea and the 
effi  cient cooperation of the Republic’s naval and land forces was one of the key 
factors that contributed to the success of the Venetian arms in this battlefi eld. It 
gave the Republic’s land forces a tactical and strategical edge that greatly com-
pensated for their numerical inferiority. Without the ability to bring reinforce-
ments and supplies to Dalmatian towns threatened by an Ottoman attack 
(Šibenik in 1647 and Split and Kotor in 1657) quickly and without obstructions, 
the Republic would hardly be able to defend its Adriatic possessions. 
99 ASVe. PTM. b. 495. num. 112. (Zara, 15. Decembre 1665)
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Very oft en just the appearance of the Venetian fl eet coming to the aid of a 
threatened post was be suffi  cient to break the moral of the Ottoman attackers 
and send them on retreat. Aware of this, Venetian commanders bringing rein-
forcements to besieged coastal towns always turned to the same trick and en-
tered the port with great pomp: with unfurled banners, sounds of instruments 
and fi ring of the cannons. All of these were intended to create the impression 
that much greater reinforcements than the actual ones were arriving. Th is tactic 
was applied with the same successful results by Governor-generals Lunardo Fo-
scolo in 1647 (during the siege of Šibenik)100 and by Antonio Bernardo in 1657 
during the attack on Split.101 Equally important was the support of the Venetian 
fl eet, in the form of additional fi repower, to the operations of the Republic’s land 
forces. For example, during Venetian attacks on Skradin or Novigrad in 1647, 
gun fi re from Venetian ships was instrumental in breaking the Ottoman defens-
es.102 Also, during the siege of Kotor salvoes from Venetian ships frustrated the 
Ottoman assaults on the town walls.103 In addition to these major operations, 
one must also not forget the participation of smaller vessels of the Adriatic 
squadron, armed boats, small galleys and fuste in countless skirmishes fought 
along the coast between the Ottoman raiders and Dalmatian village militias or 
Morlacchi irregulars. And for the latter the fi re support of these Venetian war-
ships oft en proved to be crucial for successful defense of their homes.
In times of war Ottoman fuste operating from their bases in the Adriatic and 
Ionian Seas could seriously threaten the transfer of goods, troops and munitions 
to the Levant. Still, as the events from the years of the War for Crete demon-
strated, they lacked the power to put a stop to it or more permanently interrupt 
it. Lack of capacity of the northern Ottoman harbors (Ulcinj and Bar) to host 
medium or large size fl eets rendered these front-line bases into a minor threat. 
Th is threat was successfully checked by a task force consisting of one or two 
100 Franjo Difnik, Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji [History of the War for Crete in Dalmatia], (Split: 
Književni krug, 1986) pp. 155-158.; Marko Jačov, Le guerre Veneto-Turche, pp. 52-61; Gligor Stanojević, 
Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata, pp. 111-113.; Ferruccio Sassi, “Le campagne di Dalmazia durante la 
guerra di Candia,” Archivo Veneto 21 (1937): pp. 78-83.; Josip Vrandečić, Borba za Jadran, pp. 74-6; 
compare also Foscolo’s reports: ASVe, PTM. b. 465. num. 317. (Di Galea Sebenico, 16. Settembre 1647)
101 ASVe, PTM. b. 481. num. 104. (Spalato, 20. Giugno 1657); Also on the attack on Split see: Grga 
Novak, Povijest Splita [History of Split], vol. 2, (Split: Čakavski sabor, 1961) pp. 1093-1106.; Josip 
Posedel, “Opsada Splita 1657. godine prema djelu Nicolinija [Siege of Split according to the work of 
Niccolini],” Kulturna baština: časopis za pitanja prošlosti splitskog područja 14 (1983): pp. 92-101.
102 For more on these military operations and the role that the navy played in them see: Franjo Difnik, 
Povijest kandijskog rata u Dalmaciji, pp. 126-7, 134-6.; Josip Vrandečić, Borba za Jadran, pp. 66-7, 70-
1, 74, 76.
103 Gligor Stanojević, Jugoslovenske zemlje. pp. 250-251.; Franjo Difnik, Povijest kandijskog rata u Dal-
maciji, pp. 250-1.
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galleys and several smaller warships patrolling the waters of the northern Alba-
nian coast under the command of Extraordinary governor of the Gulf. Simi-
larly, the port of Herceg-Novi, due to its position in the bay of Kotor, was also 
rather easily neutralized by Venetian blockading force of no more than few bar-
che armate. Without help from the main Ottoman fl eet or squadrons from the 
Barbary Coast, these front-line Ottoman bases were too weak to threaten the 
Venetian dominion of the Gulf. Th eir activity was successfully suppressed by the 
limited forces allotted to this battlefi eld by the Venetian high command.
In addition to these front-line bases, the Ottomans also had at their disposal two 
other respectable naval bases in the Adriatic: ports of Vlorë and Durrës, both 
capable of providing a shelter for large size fl eets. However, in this war the Ot-
tomans failed to utilize the strategic potential of these ports as they never dis-
patched a squadron of Imperial navy to either of these harbors. Th e only time 
when the Porte arranged for deployment of substantial naval forces in the Adri-
atic occurred in 1657, yet neither one of these ports was given a role in the 
Ottoman plans for that campaign. According to the reports received in May 
1657 by Antonio Bernardo, Governor-general in Dalmatia and Albania, from 
his confi dants and spies, the fl eet of the beys of Tunis, consisting of 14 galley 
and 18 large ships of war, was ordered to sail to the Adriatic. Th is fl eet was not 
heading for some Albanian port, but instead for the independent and neutral 
port of Dubrovnik (Ragusa), the sole port in the middle Adriatic that was capa-
ble of hosting fl eets of signifi cant size that was not in the Venetian hands. Th e 
Porte planned to use Ragusa as its main base of operations for the coming cam-
paign season and combined land and sea attacks on Split in Dalmatia and/or 
Kotor in Venetian Albania. Fortunately for both Adriatic republics, an unex-
pected storm stranded this fl eet on the coast of Sicily and thus it never made it 
to Ragusa, its rendezvous point with the army of the pasha of Bosnia.104
Th e main strategic problem the Republic faced in the Adriatic was not a lack of 
good port-towns but rather the fact that there were too many of them along the 
vital line of communication towards the Levant. Th e capture of any Dalmatian 
town by the Ottomans and establishment of a major hostile naval base in the mid-
dle of the Adriatic would create a new source of threat to the Republic’s control 
of maritime lines of communication. Such a threat would have had to be matched 
by deployment of additional naval forces in the Adriatic, forces that would thus 
not been available for the Aegean theater of operations. Grave consequences for 
104 ASVe, PTM. b. 481. num. 97. (Zara, 8 Maggio 1657); As late as June, Bosnian Pasha was still wait-
ing to hear news and confi rmations concerning arrival of this fl eet: ASVe, PTM. b. 481. num. 101. 
(Budua, 9. Giugno 1657)
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the Republic’s ability to wage war overseas which would have resulted from the 
loss of the Dalmatian coast and/or loss of control over Adriatic were rather 
 accurately summarized by Gaetano Cozzi, who stated that without Dalmatia “Ven-
ezia sarebbe stata soff ocata nella sua laguna, e sarebbero rimasti bloccati i suoi 
traffi  ci e le sue comunicazioni, e impedito l’invio di qualsi voglia soccorso a Candia, 
così come alle altre isole che il Turco si fosse deciso a conquistare.”105 However, this 
worst case scenario never materialized, and, as argued in this study, in no small 
measure due to the performance of the Adriatic squadron.
105 Gaetanno Cozzi, “Venezia nell’ XVI e XVII. secoli” in Gaetano Cozzi, Michael Knapton and Gio-
vanni Scarabello eds. La Repubblica di Venezia nell’età moderna: dal 1517 alla fi ne della Repubblica 
(Unione Tipografi co-Editrice Torinese, 1992) p. 119.
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„Jadranska eskadra” (1645-1669): obrana Jadrana 







Glavni predmeti istraživanja ove studije su: (1) pomorske snage pod zapovjed-
ništvom generalnih providura Dalmacije i Albanije, u ovom eseju nazvane ‘Ja-
dranska eskadra’, te (2) problemi organizacije obrane Jadrana u doba Kandijskog 
rata (1645-1669). Preciznije rečeno, istraživačka pitanja koja tvore tematsku 
osnovicu ovog članka su: ustroj, sastav i operativni zadaci stavljeni pred Jadran-
sku eskadru u vrijeme Kandijskog rata, potom, problemi zapovijedanja i vojne 
administracije specifi čni za ovu postrojbu te konačno logistički izazovi održava-
nja Jadranske eskadre operativnom tijekom skoro 25-godišnjeg sukoba. U svije-
tlu izloženih podataka o angažmanu pomorskih snaga Venecije u ovom ratištu 
članak se također dotiče i pitanja strateške važnosti kontrole pomorskih komu-
nikacija kroz Jadran za Mletačku Republiku, kao nužnog preduvjeta za vođenje 
vojnih operacija na Levantu.
Ključne riječi: Venecija, Kandijski rat, Osmansko Carstvo, vojna povijest, Jadran, 
pomorsko ratovanje, rani novi vijek, galije, fuste, galijice.
